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Jurisdiction Over the Foreign Non-
Sovereign Defendant*
RUSSELL J. WEINrRAUB**
If a foreign defendant contests personal jurisdiction, it is likely
that the defendant will be asked to submit to discovery concern-
ing its contacts with the forum. There are special problems in or-
dering a defendant to submit to discovery before deciding that
there is jurisdiction over the defendant. These problems are com-
pounded if the defendant claims that the ordered discovery will
violate the law of a foreign country. If the defendant's good faith
efforts to obey discovery orders on the jurisdictional issue are
thwarted by foreign law, it is questionable whether the discovery
order should stand or whether any sanction should be imposed on
the defendant for noncompliance.
INTRODUCTION
This article explores some problems of obtaining personal juris-
diction over a business organized abroad. The focus is on defend-
ants who are not suable under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976.1 Three issues, in particular, receive attention here.
* © Copyright 1981, Russell J. Weintraub.
** Bryant Smith Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law. B.A.,
New York University; J.D., Harvard. Author, COITARY ON THE CONFUCT OF
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1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1976). [Thus, this article omits discussion of the
special problems of suit under that Act. Most of the issues discussed in this arti-
cle, however, will also be present in suits under the Act. For example, problems of
due process limits on jurisdiction are not removed by the Act. The Act does not
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First, recent developments in the law of personal jurisdiction
have special relevance for the foreign defendant. Second, it is es-
pecially likely that the plaintiff will wish a foreign defendant to
submit to discovery on the jurisdictional issue. There are special
problems of discovery on this threshold issue. Third, the defend-
ant may claim that discovery will subject the defendant to civil or
criminal liability under the law-of another country. This impedi-
ment to discovery may affect discovery orders and sanctions for
failure to comply with those orders.
DUE PROCESS I/MITATIONS ON JURISDICTION
The outer limits of personal jurisdiction are marked by the due
process clauses of the fifth (federal courts) and fourteenth (state
courts) amendments of the United States Constitution. Up to ap-
proximately thirty-five years ago, the prevailing theory of in per-
sonam jurisdiction was a "power" theory-in order to have
jurisdiction over a defendant, the court must be able to exercise
physical power over him. Pennoyer v. Neff 2 epitomizes this power
concept with its statement that a state court can render a valid
personal judgment against a nonresident only if he is "brought
within its jurisdiction by service of process within the State, or
his voluntary appearance." 3
The modern development of personal jurisdiction began with
International Shoe Co. v. Washington.4 There the United States
Supreme Court discarded the old power theory and various
fictions that had served as substitutes for that theory. The Court
declared that a defendant, though not served within the state,
could be subjected to personal jurisdiction if "he [has] certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' "5
This sounded as though the Court was ready to greatly expand
the possibility of obtaining personal jurisdiction over nonresi-
dents. That the Court was moving to extend jurisdiction and min-
imize the barrier of geographical boundaries was briefly
confirmed in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. 6 Califor-
nia was permitted to exercise jurisdiction over a Texas corpora-
tion in a suit on the only policy that the Texas defendant had ever
and cannot confer jurisdiction that would violate due process. See Carey v. Na-
tional Oil Corp., 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979).]
2. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
3. Id. at 733.
4. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
5. Id. at 316.
6. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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issued or solicited in California. The court noted that "a trend is
clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of
state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresi-
dents ' 7 and traced this trend to changes in transportation and
communication that "have made it much less burdensome for a
party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in eco-
nomic activity."8
But McGee represented the high watermark of personal juris-
diction and the tide has been ebbing ever since. Hanson v.
Denckla,9 retreated from the expansive statements in Interna-
tional Shoe and McGee. Florida was forbidden to exercise juris-
diction over a Delaware trustee who had received and acted on
instructions mailed from Florida by the settlor of a trust. The
trustee had also remitted trust income to the settlor in Florida.
Two famous passages from Hanson emphasize the importance of
state lines and impose important limits on personal jurisdiction:
However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defend-
ant may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the "minimal con-
tacts" with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over
him.10
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a non-
resident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of a contact with the fo-
rum State.... [I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.1 1
The retreat from expansive notions of personal jurisdiction has
continued unabated since Hanson, the Court often invoking the
famous phrases from the Hanson opinion: "unilateral activity",
"purposefully avails", "benefits and protections of its laws". Shaf-
fer v. Heitner12 placed new limits on the use of quasi in rem juris-
diction, holding that a derivative stockholders' suit against the
directors of a Delaware corporation could not be brought in that
state against nonresident directors by exercising quasi in rem ju-
risdiction over their stock and other corporate rights. The Court
expressed doubt whether Delaware had a constitutional basis for
personal jurisdiction over the nonresident directors.13 If directors
7. Id. at 222.
8. Id. at 223.
9. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
10. Id. at 251.
11. Id. at 253.
12. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
13. Id. at 216.
cannot be compelled to respond to a derivative stockholders' suit
in the state of incorporation, the limits on personal jurisdiction
are narrow indeed.14
Kulko v. Superior Court'5 continued the Hanson line of cases
limiting jurisdiction. A father's acquiescence to his child's desire
to move to California to live with the mother was held not to give
California courts jurisdiction over the father in a suit to increase
support payments. The opinion emphasizes the "unilateral activ-
ity", "purposefully avails" language of Hanson.
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodsen16 is the latest and perhaps
most significant of the cases limiting personal jurisdiction that fol-
lowed Hanson. Plaintiffs purchased an automobile in New York.
The following year the family left New York for a new home in
Arizona. As they passed through Oklahoma, another car struck
their vehicle in the rear, causing a fire which injured the wife and
two children. Plaintiffs brought suit in Oklahoma claiming defec-
tive design in the placement of the fuel tank. Joined as defend-
ants were the manufacturer, the importer, the regional distributor
(who distributed only to dealers in New York, New Jersey, and
Connecticut), and the New York retail dealer from whom the au-
tomobile had been purchased. The Court held that Oklahoma
could not constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over the regional
distributor or the dealer, neither of whom conducted activities in
Oklahoma.
This result is not very remarkable. What is of special interest is
the language in World-Wide renewing the call for restrictions on
personal jurisdiction. The Court noted that although it was fore-
seeable that the automobile would cause injury in Oklahoma, this
kind of foreseeability would not overcome due process objections:
[T] he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere
likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it
is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are
such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there...
[Citations omitted]. The Due Process Clause, by ensuring the "orderly
administration of the laws," International Shoe Co. v. Washington, ....
gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential
defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assur-
ance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to
suit.1 7
World-Wide's discussion of foreseeability and predictability has
14. Delaware has, since Shaffer, enacted a statute exercising jurisdiction over
directors of Delaware corporations in actions related to their duties as directors.
10 Del.C. § 3114 (Supp. 1980). The constitutionality of this statute has been upheld.
Armstrong v. Pomerance, 423 A.2d 174 (Del. 1980).
15. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
16. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
17. Id. at 297.
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important implications for the defendant from another country. If
the defendant acts abroad it will not be subject to jurisdiction
here for the consequences of those acts unless either the effects
here are normal or the defendant is engaged in substantial busi-
ness activities in the United States forum. Take for example in-
jury caused here by a product manufactured abroad. The
manufacturer should be subject to jurisdiction here if the item
that caused the injury is shipped by the defendant to the United
States market in which injury occurs.'8 The manufacturer should
also be suable here if it sells the product abroad to a distributor
that sells the product here.19 If, however, the manufacturer's
product is sold only abroad and is brought into this country by a
buyer, the manufacturer should be subject to jurisdiction only if it
conducts substantial business activities in the forum.20 The Uni-
form Interstate and International Procedure Act 21 contains a spe-
cial provision for obtaining jurisdiction over a defendant who
causes "tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside
this state."= The Act provides for jurisdiction over such a defend-
ant only "if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in
any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial rev-
enue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this
state."23 This provision comes close to codifying what World-
Wide seems to require. The flaw in this provision is that it draws
no distinction between the defendant who ships the product di-
rectly into the forum or sells to a distributor for forum sale and a
defendant who does not expect its product to reach the forum in
the ordinary course of commercial distribution. The defendant
whose product is normally sold in the forum should not receive
the protection of the additional requirement that it engage "in a
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue" from
18. See, e.g., Beetler v. Zotos, 388 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1967); Deveny v. Rheem
Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963).
19. See Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980).
20. Jurisdiction is especially justified if the "substantial business activities in
the forum" consist of the sale of identical products that the manufacturer did ship
into the forum either directly or through a distributor. See Le Manufacture Fran-
caise Des Pneumatiques Michelin v. District Court, 620 P.2d 1040 (Col. 1980); of
Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956)
(Judge Sobeloff's hypothetical involving a California tire dealer and a Penn-
sylvania tourist), cited with approval in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-
son, 444 U.S. 286, 296 (1980).
21. UNIF. INTERSTATE AND INT'L PROCEDURE AcT, 13 U.LA 459 (1980).
22. UNIF. INTERSTATE AND INT'L PROCEDURE AcT § 1.03(a) (4) (1980).
23. Id.
forum activities if the suit is from claims arising from that
product.
World-Wide was addressing the interstate product liability suit.
There is, however, much reason to extend World-Wide's limita-
tions to international jurisdictional problems. It is true that one
reason for territorial limits on state-court jurisdiction is missing
in the international context. This reason stems from the require-
ments of federalism, the decent respect for the strongly held poli-
cies and concerns of sister states.24 These requirements are
violated if one state exercises jurisdiction over the citizens of an-
other without a reasonable nexus with the defendant or the de-
fendant's course of conduct. This element of federalism is
distinct from and in addition to the other reason for territorial
limits on jurisdiction-fairness to the defendant. If the defend-
ant's convenience were all that was at issue, a defendant could
hardly object to suit in the court of a neighboring state closer to
the defendant's home than the nearest court in defendant's home
state.25
Although the restraints of federalism are absent in a suit
against a foreign defendant, the due process requirement of ele-
mentary fairness to the defendant remains. Moreover, considera-
tions of international comity fill the gap when federalist concepts
are removed. Our courts should not seek jurisdiction that will de-
prive our system of justice of the decent respect of friendly for-
eign countries. The harm from judicial overreaching against
foreign defendants is likely to be immediate and practical. If the
foreign defendant conducts no substantial commercial activities
in the United States, the defendant is not likely to have assets
here to satisfy a judgment and a substantial unsatisfied judgment
is likely to discourage the defendant from future activities here
that would place its assets at risk. The "successful" plaintiff,
then, will be faced with the necessity of an expensive and difficult
attempt to get the United States judgment, based on questionable
jurisdictional premises, recognized abroad. As the Ninth Circuit
recently said in dismissing a suit against three British defendants
for lack of personal jurisdiction, "the foreign-act-with-forum-ef-
fects jurisdictional principle 'must be applied with caution, partic-
ularly in an international context.' "26
In a suit against a foreign defendant, it is likely that trial will be
24. See Comment, Federalism, Due Process, and Minimum Contacts: World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 80 COLtJM. L. REV. 1341, 1348 (1980).
25. Id. at 1344.
26. Kramer Motors, Inc. v. British Leyland, Ltd., 628 F.2d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir.
1980) (quoting Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1341
(2d Cir. 1972)).
436
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in a federal district court. If suit is originally filed in a state court,
the defendant will probably remove to federal court.27 Absent a
special federal statute granting jurisdiction over the defendant,
such as Section 1330(b) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976,28 the federal court's jurisdiction is dependent on the long-
arm jurisdiction of the state in which it is sitting.29 A recent Fifth
Circuit opinion 30 raises the question whether the federal court
must also follow the state courts' holdings as to proper due pro-
cess limits on jurisdiction. The federal court cannot be expected
to follow a state court beyond what the federal court thinks are
proper constitutional limits. But can the federal court cast its due
process net further than the state court thinks is proper?
The court in Southwest Offset, Inc. v. Hudco Publishing Co.,31
held that a Texas federal district court had personal jurisdiction
over an Alabama buyer of telephone directories printed in Texas
by the plaintiff. In doing so, the court first distinguished the lead-
ing Texas Supreme Court case, U-Anchbr Advertising, Inc. v.
Burt.32 U-Anchor held that due process prevented a Texas court
from exercising jurisdiction over an Oklahoma customer of a
Texas manufacturer-displayer of advertising signs. The court
found more contacts with Texas in Southwest Offset than in U-
Anchor.33 The court, however, went on to state:
[E]ven if we were to assume arguendo that the facts of this case were
closer to those found in U-Anchor, we would not be bound by that court's
holding on lack of minimum contacts. This is so because the Texas
Supreme Court's holding in U-Anchor was predicated on the due process
clause of the United States Constitution, and the federal courts are not
bound by state court determinations of what the Constitution requires.
3 4
This suggestion that a federal court need not follow state limits
on personal jurisdiction when state long-arm process is being
used seems very questionable. The state court is unlikely to ac-
cede to a federal district or circuit court's views of due process.
This will produce the kind of intrastate forum shopping between
state and federal courts that has been decried from Erie Railroad
27. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1976).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1976).
29. See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 1963).
30. Southwest Offset, Inc. v. Hudco Pub. Co., 622 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1980).
31. 622 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1980).
32. 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
33. 622 F.2d at 152.
34. Id.
v. Tompkins 35 to Hanna v. Plumer.36 The state can decline to ex-
ercise personal jurisdiction to due process limits. If the state
court wishes to impose its views of constitutional jurisdictional
limits on federal courts, it can do so beyond cavil by basing its
opinion on the state constitution's due process clause3 7 or its
analogue. 38
DIscoVERY ON THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE
World-Wide draws due process limits on jurisdiction to permit
"defendants to structure their primary conduct with some mini-
mum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render
them liable to suit."3 9 It is especially likely after World-Wide that,
when a foreign defendant contests jurisdiction, the plaintiff will
wish to obtain discovery from the defendant concerning defend-
ant's "primary conduct" related to the forum and, therefore, to the
jurisdictional issue. On the surface it seems somewhat anoma-
lous to order a defendant to submit to discovery before the court
decides that it has jurisdiction over the defendant. On the other
hand, the defendant has appeared to contest jurisdiction. The de-
fendant, if it wished, could have stayed away and raised its juris-
dictional objections in the form of a collateral attack on the
default judgment when enforcement was sought in a sister state4O
or abroad. In doing so, the defendant would have waived all de-
fenses except lack of jurisdiction.41 By appearing and contesting
jurisdiction, the defendant grants the court power to bind the de-
fendant by the court's jurisdictional finding.42 Therefore, discov-
ery on the jurisdictional issue itself is not beyond the pale. But
what is the proper scope of discovery on the jurisdictional issue?
In federal court, when a defendant challenges personal jurisdic-
tion by a 12(b) (2)43 motion, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff
to establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.44
Before any discovery is ordered, the plaintiff is required to make
a threshold showing of the likelihood of jurisdiction.45 After such
35. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
36. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
37. Cf. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (California
Supreme Court can, under California Constitution, require access to shopping
center although access is not required under the United States Constitution).
38. See, e.g., TEx. CONST., Art. I, § 19 ("due course of the law of the land").
39. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
40. See Baker v. Baker, Eccles, & Co., 242 U.S. 394, 403 (1917).
41. See Purser v. Corpus Christi State Nat'1 Bk., 258 Ark. 54, 522 S.W.2d 187
(1975).
42. Id.
43. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b) (2) (1976).
44. See Marshall Exports, Inc. v. Phillips, 507 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1974).
45. See Lehigh Valley Ind., Inc. v. Birenbaum, 527 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1975).
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a showing, whether or not the defendant should be ordered to
submit to discovery to assist the plaintiff in meeting its burden is
a matter of discretion.46 This discretion has been carefully exer-
cised to avoid placing undue burdens on the defendant before a
decision is made that there is jurisdiction over the defendant. In
River Plate Corp. v. Forestal Land, Timber & Railway,47 Judge
Frederick van Pelt Bryan spotlighted the issue by remarking:
"Whether the defendant has shown sufficient to justify the taking
of depositions on the jurisdiction question is not free from
doubt."48 He decided that oral depositions may be taken under
letters rogatory in England and in Argentina,4 9 but goes on to pro-
tect the defendant by ruling that the defendant is entitled to have
United States counsel present at the depositions because such
counsel would be more familiar with American jurisdictional
standards. The plaintiff, however, shall pay the cost of such coun-
sel, including expenses and attorneys' fees. This expense is a tax-
able cost to be recouped by the plaintiff if the plaintiff eventually
prevails and recovers costs. In Lehigh Valley Industries, Inc. v.
Birenbaum,50 the court held that "there is a threshold failure here
to establish any basis for finding that [defendant] committed any
tortious activity in New York and that there was no abuse of dis-
cretion below in denying discovery."5 1 Judge Henry Friendly, in
Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 52 found
that it was error to dismiss a suit against an English defendant on
the jurisdictional issue before the defendant answered the plain-
tiff's interrogatories. In so holding, Judge Friendly emphasized
that "the burden of answering these would have been slight."53
Judge Irving Kaufman, in Petroleum Financial Corp. v. Stone,5 4
articulated concern for protecting the defendant from unfair bur-
dens that may attach to discovery on the issue of jurisdiction over
the defendant. He ruled that plaintiff's affidavits were insufficient
to show that the defendant did business in New York and that the
plaintiff was not entitled to take depositions in New York to ob-
46. See River Plate Corp. v. Forestal Land, Timber & Ry Co., 185 F. Supp. 832
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
47. 185 F. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
48. Id. at 836.
49. Id. at 837-38.
50. 527 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1975).
51. Id. at 94.
52. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
53. Id. at 1343.
54. 111 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
tain further information on defendant's business activities in New
York.
Even if the costs were to be borne by the plaintiff, it would appear that in
seeking the depositions for this purpose, plaintiff is attempting to pull it-
self up by its own bootstraps. Absent the prior finding that [defendants]
were doing business in this state, .. . this court would be exceedingly re-
luctant to exercise its discretion... to compel parties to come to New
York from Texas to determine whether this court in fact has jurisdiction
over them.
5 5
Judge Kaufman remarked that the plaintiff could take depositions
in Texas. 56
SANCTIONS AGAINST A DEFENDANT UNABLE TO COMPLY WITH A
DIScOvERY ORDER
Even in cases in which there is no question that the court has
in personam jurisdiction over the defendant, the court must exer-
cise great care before imposing sanctions on the defendant for
failure to comply with a discovery order if failure is caused be-
cause discovery is forbidden by the law of another country. The
leading case is Societe International Pour Participations Industri-
elles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers.5 7 The plaintiff, a Swiss
holding company, was suing under the Trading with the Enemy
Act for return of property seized by the Alien Property Custodian.
The United States Supreme Court held it error to dismiss the
complaint with prejudice for failure to comply with a discovery or-
der when production of the records in issue would violate Swiss
penal laws and when the plaintiff had shown its good faith. The
plaintiff had obtained waivers enabling it to produce many of the
documents requested and had suggested a plan for identifying
further relevant documents and seeking their production. The
Court held that the production order itself was justified under the
circumstances, though the sanction for noncompliance with the
order was improper. The Court expressed doubt whether an or-
der to produce would always be appropriate: "We do not say that
this ruling [that the trial court was justified in issuing the produc-
tion order] would apply to every situation where a party is re-
stricted by law from producing documents over which it is
otherwise shown to have control."58 On the question of what
sanctions, if any, would be appropriate for the failure to produce
the Swiss records, the Court indicated that a sufficient sanction
might be simply the plaintiff's resulting inability to rebut evi-
dence against it and perhaps, though not certainly, the drawing of
55. Id. at 353-54.
56. Id. at 354.
57. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
58. Id. at 205-06.
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inferences unfavorable to the plaintiff on events as to which dis-
covery was not available:
It may be that in a trial on the merits, petitioner's inability to produce spe-
cific information will prove a serious handicap in dispelling doubt the Gov-
ernment might be able to inject into the- case. It may be that in the
absence of complete disclosure by the petitioner, the District Court would
be justified in drawing inferences unfavorable to petitioner as to particular
events.59
A recent case applying the Societe International standards is In
re Westinghouse Corp. 60 The company ordered to produce docu-
ments was only a witness, not a party, and there was no question
that the court had jurisdiction over the company, which operated
a mine in the forum. The court held that it was error to hold the
company in contempt for failure to produce Canadian records
when production would subject the company to Canadian crimi-
nal sanctions and when the company had shown its good faith by
seeking waivers from Canadian officials. The court did note that
Westinghouse's defense did not stand or fall on the discovery or-
der. Westinghouse could search the records of and depose other
uranium companies for the information it desired.61
Combining the reluctance of courts to put unfair burdens on
the defendant when ordering discovery on the jurisdictional is-
sue62 with the Societe-Westinghouse protection of parties unable
to produce documents because of foreign regulations, an argu-
ment can be made against any form of sanction when a foreign
defendant is unable to produce documents relating to the jurisdic-
tional issue and failure is caused by defendant's good faith inabil-
ity to circumvent foreign regulations. This is exactly what the
court in Societe may have been referring to in questioning
whether sometimes a discovery order is proper at all,63 and even
more likely is the case alluded to in which the only "sanction"
against the defendant should be the defendant's inability to meet
the plaintiff's evidence.6 4 The double unfairness to the defendant
of allowing discovery on the jurisdictional issue plus the inability
to comply with the discovery order may preclude any more severe
sanction including the shifting of the burden of proof which,
59. Id. at 212-13.
60. 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977).
61. Id. at 999.
62. See notes 45-56 and accompanying text supra.
63. 357 U.S. at 205-06.
64. Id. at 212-13.
under Federal Rule 12(b) (2),65 is on the plaintiff.6 6
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court's discussion in World-Wide
Volkswagen67 of state-court jurisdiction indicates that foreign de-
fendants whose activities abroad cause effects in the United
States should not be subject to suit here for claims arising out of
those effects unless one of two conditions is met. Either the ef-
fects here should be normal or the defendant's activities in the fo-
rum should be so substantial that the defendant could reasonably
have expected to be sued in the forum with respect to those
claims. This makes it likely that the plaintiff will wish to subject
the defendant to discovery concerning forum activities sufficient
to provide jurisdiction. Ordering the defendant to submit to dis-
covery before deciding that there is jurisdiction over the defend-
ant is at best a difficult task requiring circumspect concern for
preventing harassment of the defendant. When, in addition, de-
fendant demonstrates that the ordered jurisdictional discovery is
forbidden by foreign law, discovery is especially questionable.
Questions then arise whether the discovery order should stand
and what sanctions, if any, should be imposed for the defendant's
refusal to violate foreign law. A key factor in answering these
questions should be whether, if the forum does not press its juris-
diction over the defendant, the plaintiff will have another forum
in which it may reasonably pursue its claim.68
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) (1976).
66. See Marshall Exports, Inc. v. Phillips, 507 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1974).
67. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
68. See In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148, 1154 (N.D.
Ill. 1979) (orders discovery on jurisdictional issue even though this would require
a violation of foreign law, and notes that if it did not have jurisdiction, important
United States antitrust policies could not be vindicated).
